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SYMPOSIUM
FREEDOM SEEKERS:
THE TRANSGRESSIVE CO NSTITUTIONALISM
OF FUGITIVES FROM SLAVERY
Rebecca E. Zietlow*
In the years leading up to the Civil War, fugitives from slavery put their lives on
the line to improve their own status and that of their families in their quest for freedom.
Fugitives from slavery, or “freedom seekers,” engaged in civil disobedience, resisting
laws that they believed to be unjust and inhumane. In the North, free black people and
their white allies supported the freedom seekers by engaging in civil disobedience of their
own. The transgressive actions of freedom seekers sparked constitutional controversy
during the antebellum era over issues of interstate comity, federalism, citizenship rights,
and fundamental human rights. Their actions were central to the antislavery struggle,
and their sacrifices sent a profound moral message which inspired other activists and
strengthened their cause. Eventually, the Reconstruction Congress enshrined their
claims into constitutional law. Until now, fugitives from slavery have largely been
absent from virtually all of the legal scholarship about the antebellum and
Reconstruction Era. This Article seeks to remedy that oversight.
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his work, and for his help and guidance on this project; and James Gray Pope, Christopher
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In The Reconstruction Amendments: The Essential Documents,1 Kurt
Lash has created an important resource for scholars of the
Reconstruction Era. Along with Supreme Court opinions and
congressional debates, Lash includes many sources written by
advocates for constitutional change. By doing so, Lash acknowledges
that constitutional meaning is not created only by courts, or even only
by lawyers, but also by political advocates and grassroots movements.
As Lash explains, “[t]he nature of the original Constitution, the
proper division of national and state power, the meaning of American
citizenship and human freedom, and the significance of race—all were
subjects of nationwide debate long before the Civil War.”2 Several of
the documents included in Volume One of the collection were written
by free black people who advocated for their own civil rights as well as
the end of slavery.3 These are significant documents because they add
to our understanding of how constitutional change happens and help
1 1 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash
ed., 2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 1]; 2 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE
ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 2].
2 LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 1, at 3.
3 See Frederick Douglass, J.M. Whitfield, H.O. Wagoner, A.N. Freeman & George B.
Vashon, Address of the Colored National Convention to the People of the United States
(July 6–8, 1853), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 1, at 150; DAVID WALKER, WALKER’S
APPEAL IN FOUR ARTICLES TOGETHER WITH A PREAMBLE TO THE COLORED CITIZENS OF THE
WORLD, BUT IN PARTICULAR AND VERY EXPRESSLY TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Boston, David Walker 1829), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 1, at 203.
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guide our interpretation of the changes wrought as a result of that
advocacy. However, there is a significant perspective missing from The
Essential Documents—that of the fugitives from slavery who served as
catalysts for the constitutional change.
Indeed, until now, fugitives from slavery have largely been absent
from virtually all of the legal scholarship about the antebellum and
Reconstruction Era.4 This Article seeks to remedy that oversight. As
William Carter has noted, “[B]y listening to enslaved persons’ voices,
we credit them as part of the contemporaneous polity whose
understandings should matter in constitutional interpretation, rather
than merely as passive beneficiaries to, or forgotten members of, the
Second Founding” which took place during the Reconstruction Era.5
The transgressive actions of freedom seekers sparked constitutional
controversy during the antebellum era over issues of interstate comity,
federalism, citizenship rights, and fundamental human rights. Their
actions were central to the antislavery struggle, and their sacrifices
send a profound moral message which inspired other activists and
strengthened their cause.6 Eventually, the Reconstruction Congress
enshrined their claims into constitutional law.
In the years leading up to the Civil War, fugitives from slavery put
their lives on the line to improve their own status and that of their
families in their quest for freedom. Fugitives from slavery, or “freedom
seekers,”7 engaged in civil disobedience, resisting laws that they
4 But see William M. Carter, Jr., The Second Founding and the First Amendment, 99 TEX.
L. REV. 1065, 1066 (2021) (arguing that courts should take the perspective of enslaved
people into account when interpreting the Constitution); Guyora Binder, Essay, Did the
Slaves Author the Thirteenth Amendment? An Essay in Redemptive History, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMANS.
471 (1993) (arguing that enslaved people should be considered as framers of the
Thirteenth Amendment).
5 Carter, supra note 4, at 1066.
6 ERIC FONER, GATEWAY TO FREEDOM: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE UNDERGROUND
RAILROAD 22 (2015) (arguing that fleeing fugitives from slavery “exemplified the political
importance of slave resistance as a whole and raised questions central to antebellum
politics,” including “the contest over slavery in the broad public sphere”); id. at 27 (quoting
J. Miller McKim, Our Philadelphia Correspondence, NAT’L ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Feb. 3,
1855, at 3) (claiming that those who encountered the fugitives were moved by their stories
and celebrated what the 1855 National Anti-Slavery Standard called their “acts of sublime
heroism”).
7 Because the identity of an enslaved person was much more than their legal status
as a slave, I use the term “enslaved person” instead of “slave.” Identifying the proper term
for “fugitive slaves” presents additional challenges, since “enslaved person seeking to
escape enslavement” is very awkward. The National Park Service has adopted the term
“freedom seekers” to describe enslaved people who were fleeing bondage. See Language of
Slavery, NAT’L PARK SERV, https://www.nps.gov/subjects/undergroundrailroad/languageof-slavery.htm [https://perma.cc/HA7K-JUT7]. Their website explains, “[w]hile African
Americans were in physical bondage, the minds and spirits of these individuals remained
free.” Id. The terminology used in the “Learn About the Underground Railroad” section
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believed to be unjust and inhumane. In the North, free black people
and their white allies supported the freedom seekers by engaging in
civil disobedience of their own. Many joined the Underground
Railroad and helped freedom seekers to escape.8 Other free black
people engaged in mass demonstrations to protest the kidnapping of
those whom slave catchers accused of being fugitives.9 Freedom
seekers raised concerns related to the fundamental structure of our
government, including interstate comity and federalism. They also
demanded fundamental human rights, foremost of which was what
Hannah Arendt calls “the right to have rights,” to be recognized as
human beings who are entitled to legal protection.10
The transgressive constitutionalism of freedom seekers created
tensions between free and slave states which ultimately led to the Civil
War.11 Their claims to freedom intensified during the Civil War, when
they fled across Union battle lines and demanded not only their
freedom, but also their right to fight for their country as citizens.12 By
doing so, they asserted their claim to citizenship and other individual
rights, which were then enforced by the Reconstruction Congress.
This Article thus challenges the standard narrative of the abolition
of slavery—that of well-meaning white lawmakers bestowing freedom
upon grateful enslaved people. In popular culture, President
Abraham Lincoln is known as the Great Emancipator, and the
Emancipation Proclamation is portrayed as the single act which freed

of this website reflects this freedom of spirit by referring to escaping African Americans as
“‘freedom seekers,’ rather than runaways, fugitives or escapees.” Id. I agree with their
sentiment. Because the purpose of this project is precisely to highlight the agency of those
people who resisted the institution of slavery, I prefer to use the term “freedom seekers.”
At times in this Article I also use the term “fugitives from slavery” to reflect the fact that
people who fled slavery were acutely aware of that aspect of their identity for the rest of
their lives, living in fear of being discovered and captured, but also claiming that status to
heighten the moral force behind their advocacy. See Angela F. Murphy, “My Freedom I
Derived from God”: Jermain Loguen’s Rejection of Freedom Purchase 1–2 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
8 See R.J.M. BLACKETT, THE CAPTIVE’S QUEST FOR FREEDOM: FUGITIVE SLAVES, THE
1850 FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 145 (2018); FONER, supra note 6,
at 15 (“[T]he underground railroad represents a moment in our history when black and
white Americans worked together in a just cause.”).
9 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 40; CHRISTOPHER JAMES BONNER, REMAKING THE
REPUBLIC: BLACK POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 96 (2020).
10 See Judith Butler, Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street (Sept. 2011)
(citing HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958)).
11 See FONER, supra note 6, at 26; JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE
DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861–1865, at 7 (2013); PAUL FINKELMAN,
AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 4 (1981).
12 See OAKES, supra note 11, at 170, 276 (describing freedom seekers fleeing across
enemy lines during the Civil War).
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enslaved people from their bondage.13 Legal scholars tend to focus
not only on Lincoln but also on the members of the Reconstruction
Congress who debated the constitutional Amendments and statutes
that abolished slavery and established individual rights for newly freed
slaves.14 Recently, legal scholars have turned their attention to popular
constitutionalism, or constitutional advocacy outside the courts,15 and
some have studied the constitutional impact of antislavery activists and
their theories of rights.16 However, until now, legal scholars have
largely overlooked the impact of fugitives from slavery on this crucial
period of U.S. constitutional development. By contrast, in the field of
history, there is currently an emerging scholarship about freedom
seekers and their individual experiences, and their free black allies in
the North.17 This Article builds on this historical scholarship and
explores the impact of this activism on how we should think about
constitutional development and the meaning of Reconstruction.
This Article thus considers what it means to be a constitutional
advocate. Plaintiffs who file lawsuits asserting their rights are clearly
constitutional advocates, and they are the focus of much of legal
scholarship about constitutional change. Political advocates who rely
13 See Kirt H. Wilson, Debating the Great Emancipator: Abraham Lincoln and Our Public
Memory, 13 RHETORIC & PUB. AFFS. 455, 455 (2010).
14 See, e.g., REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, THE FORGOTTEN EMANCIPATOR: JAMES MITCHELL
ASHLEY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF RECONSTRUCTION (2018); GERARD N.
MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013); Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of
Congressman John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589 (2003);
Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and Abolitionist Background of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. U.
L. REV. 881 (1988); Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX.
L. REV. 1361 (2016); Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship
Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389 (2018).
15 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001);
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004).
16 See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 859
(2016) (describing the advocacy of antislavery and antebellum labor movements and how
their rights claims influenced the Reconstruction Congress); Randy E. Barnett, Whence
Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
165 (2011); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part III: Andrew
Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L.J. 1275 (2013).
17 See, e.g., BLACKETT, supra note 8; BONNER, supra note 9; ANDREW DELBANCO, THE
WAR BEFORE THE WAR: FUGITIVE SLAVES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA’S SOUL FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (2018); FONER, supra note 6; MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018); KATE MASUR,
UNTIL JUSTICE BE DONE: AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO RECONSTRUCTION (2021); NIKKI M. TAYLOR, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM: CINCINNATI’S
BLACK COMMUNITY, 1802–1868 (2005); FUGITIVE SLAVES AND SPACES OF FREEDOM IN NORTH
AMERICA (Damian Alan Pargas ed., 2018) [hereinafter FUGITIVE SLAVES].
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on the Constitution to support their claims are also constitutional
advocates and the subject of the new scholarship on popular
constitutionalism. Fugitives from slavery engaged in both of those
forms of constitutional advocacy. Some filed lawsuits claiming their
right to freedom, and some actually won those suits.18 Others engaged
in political activism. Some freedom seekers published narratives of
their lives, testaments to the cruelty of slavery which persuaded many
to join the antislavery cause.19 Fugitive slaves such as Frederick
Douglass served as leaders of the abolitionist movement, especially in
the decades leading up to the Civil War.20
The vast majority of freedom seekers, however, did not openly
advocate for political change for obvious reasons—they were afraid of
being captured and returned to slavery. However, they also engaged
in constitutional activism, what I call “performative constitutionalism”—using their bodies and actions to assert constitutional claims.
Freedom seekers engaged in a particular form of performative
constitutionalism—“transgressive constitutionalism.” By transgressing
borders from slave states to free, they asserted their claims to freedom
and fundamental human rights with their actions.
Until now overlooked by legal scholars, the transgressive
constitutionalism of fugitives from slavery served as a crucial catalyst
for the constitutional changes which occurred during the Civil War
and Reconstruction Era. Perhaps the reason why legal scholars have
largely overlooked the transgressive constitutionalism of fugitives from
slavery is that they mostly did not make claims in express constitutional
terms.21 Determining the mindset of those who engaged in transgressive constitutionalism presents additional challenges. Enslaved people
were silenced by law, forbidden from advocating for the end of slavery

18 See LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION SONGS: SUING FOR FREEDOM BEFORE DRED
SCOTT (2014); ANNE TWITTY, BEFORE DRED SCOTT: SLAVERY AND LEGAL CULTURE IN THE
AMERICAN CONFLUENCE, 1787–1857 (2016).
19 See MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 421 (2016)
(“Fugitive slaves created an authentic, original, and independent critique of slaveholding,
one which made their narratives potent antislavery material.”). The most prominent slave
narrative was that of Frederick Douglass. See FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE (Dublin, Webb & Chapman 1845).
Originally published in 1845, the narrative was widely read and catapulted Douglass to the
forefront of the abolitionist movement. See SINHA, supra, at 426 (explaining that Douglass’s
narrative made him an “instant celebrity”).
20 See FONER, supra note 6, at 23. Frederick Douglass was the most prominent fugitive
from slavery to lead the abolitionist movement. Other fugitives who played a leading role
include Pennington, Henry Highland Garnet, Henry Bibb, Henry Brown, and Harriet
Tubman. FONER, supra note 6, at 23–24.
21 As mentioned earlier, Lash’s compilation does include documents written by free
black activists who made claims in constitutional terms. See supra note 1.
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or even criticizing those who held them in bondage.22 Enslaved people
could not enter into contracts, file lawsuits, testify in court, or petition
the government for redress.23 Laws in slave states prohibited enslaved
people from learning to read or write so most were illiterate, unable to
write letters or other documents for historians to read.24 Moreover,
any attempt to assert any of these rights would jeopardize their lives.
Some freedom seekers published fugitive slave narratives that were
highly influential during the years leading up to the Civil War.25
However, the only way that most enslaved people could express their
natural human rights was to escape their situation and travel across
borders to free states.
Regardless of whether freedom seekers viewed themselves as
asserting constitutional claims, however, they actually asserted
constitutional claims through their actions. By transgressing borders
from slave state to free, they claimed freedom for themselves, claimed
the soil on which they stood as free soil, and asserted fundamental
constitutional rights. By travelling, they asserted the right to travel. By
claiming freedom, they claimed the places to which they travelled as
free spaces. By resisting federal laws which authorized their capture
and re-enslavement, they invoked due process rights and the right of
people in states in which they were located to also resist federal
authority. Freedom seekers’ actions had constitutional implications,
and others translated their actions into constitutional claims.
This Article makes four fundamental arguments. First, it argues
that freedom seekers were constitutional actors who engaged in
multiple formats of constitutional activism. Second, freedom seekers
engaged in transgressive constitutionalism, crossing borders to make
constitutional claims. Third, by transgressing borders, freedom
seekers sparked constitutional controversies over issues of interstate

22 See Annette Gordon-Reed, Rebellious History, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/10/22/saidiya-hartman-rebellious-history/
[https://perma.cc/MAG2-YHE6].
23 See Viola Franziska Müller, Illegal but Tolerated: Slave Refugees in Richmond, Virginia,
1800–1860, in FUGITIVE SLAVES, supra note 17, at 137, 139. In fact, no opponents of slavery
could petition the government because slave states enacted laws prohibiting anyone from
criticizing slavery. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5 (2000).
24 In his narrative, Frederick Douglass describes how his mistress began to teach him
to read and write before her husband stopped her. DOUGLASS, supra note 19, at 33. He
then befriended the white boys in his Baltimore neighborhood and asked them to teach
him to read. Id. at 38. Formerly enslaved William Singleton later recalled that he was once
“whipped simply because it was thought [he] had opened a book.” WILLIAM HENRY
SINGLETON, RECOLLECTIONS OF MY SLAVERY DAYS 10 (Acad. Affs. Libr., Univ. of N.C. at
Chapel Hill 2000) (1922).
25 See SINHA, supra note 19, at 421.
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comity and federalism which exacerbated tensions that led to the Civil
War. During the war, they used their bodies and their actions to
transform a war to save the union into a war to end slavery. Finally,
freedom seekers made individual rights claims that resonated with
those made by Northern black civil rights advocates. These claims
influenced the Reconstruction Congress who enshrined them into
constitutional law. This Article thus challenges the standard narrative
of emancipation—that of enslaved people being acted upon by
lawmakers without agency of their own. Instead, it recognizes freedom
seekers as constitutional actors, engaged in a highly effective form of
popular constitutionalism.
I.

FREEDOM SEEKERS AS CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCATES

What does it mean to be a constitutional advocate? Many legal
scholars take the answer to this question for granted. They focus
primarily on court rulings and the participants in those cases.
However, in recent decades legal scholars have begun to explore the
question of how constitutional development occurs in greater depth.26
Increasingly, legal scholars are recognizing that constitutional law does
not develop in a vacuum, in federal courtrooms isolated from politics.
Politics influences constitutional change, and advocates often make
political arguments in constitutional terms. This Part explores the
different ways in which those who seek constitutional change can bring
about that change. In addition to using their voices, I argue that
advocates sometimes make constitutional arguments with their bodies
and their actions. I call this third type of constitutional advocacy
“performative constitutionalism.” Freedom seekers engaged in all of
these forms of constitutional advocacy, but arguably they were most
effective when they engaged in performative constitutionalism to
transgress legal and physical borders.
A. Litigants in Constitutional Cases
Litigants in constitutional cases are clearly constitutional actors
when they invoke the Constitution to support their legal claims.
Constitutional scholars tend to focus on these constitutional actors,
and on the court decisions that they engender. In the court-centered
field of constitutional law, individuals who seek to assert their rights

26 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Essay, Principles, Practices, and Social
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and
American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73 (2000); Keith E. Whittington,
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United
States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005).
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need lawyers to translate their concerns into legal causes of action.
Judges further abstract their claims when issuing rulings evaluating
those claims. Those rulings establish legal principles to guide future
litigants, lawyers, and courts. On the ground, however, those rulings
have no impact until they are enforced by other government officials.
Moreover, litigants in constitutional cases face significant barriers.
First, they must be sophisticated enough to recognize that they might
have a legal claim. Second, they must have access to lawyers, and the
financial resources to pay those lawyers. Finally, individual litigants
must have the courage and fortitude to withstand the spotlight if they
prevail in controversial cases.
Some freedom seekers filed lawsuits and made legal claims in
court.27 Some of their lawsuits were based on individual circumstances,
such as claims that their masters had promised to free them. Fugitives
from slavery who were captured by slave catchers brought legal
challenges to the affidavits brought by slave catchers.28 A significant
number of enslaved people, however, made a broader claim—that they
had become free when they crossed borders into free states and
territories. They asserted what they called the “freedom principle,”
that their legal status changed once they transgressed the border into
free space.29 In the 1856 case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,30 the United
States Supreme Court rejected this argument, but prior to Dred Scott,
some litigants prevailed. In fact, before Dred Scott, over 100 enslaved
people successfully petitioned for freedom in the city of St. Louis.31 In
Ohio, an appeals court found that a formerly enslaved woman named
Rosetta was free because she had been brought into the free state of
Ohio with the consent of her owner.32 The ruling in the Rosetta case
only provided partial support for the freedom principle, since it did
not apply to enslaved people who fled across state borders against the
will of their slaveholders. However, all of these cases illustrate the fact
that prior to Dred Scott, the freedom principle was a viable legal
argument. Moreover, the act of filing lawsuits alone was an assertion
of a right to belong, and to be treated as a human being under the law.

27 See generally VANDERVELDE, supra note 18; TWITTY, supra note 18.
28 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 61.
29 See FONER, supra note 6, at 20 (describing the “‘freedom principle’ [as] the doctrine
that once a slave (other than a fugitive) left a jurisdiction where local law established slavery,
he or she automatically became free”).
30 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
31 See Lea VanderVelde, The Dred Scott Case in Context, 40 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 263, 269
(2015).
32 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 247–48. Rosetta was represented by Salmon Chase and
Rutherford B. Hayes. Id. at 247.
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B. Political Advocacy and Popular Constitutionalism
Political activists who invoke the constitution are a second type of
constitutional actor.33 Often political activists speak in terms of
constitutional claims. For example, gun rights activists invoke the
Second Amendment.34 Civil rights activists invoke the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.35 Political activists sometimes make arguments in express constitutional terms, and other times simply invoke
constitutional values. They are often successful at convincing political
branches to enact legislation enforcing their rights. Arguably, they
sometimes influence courts’ constitutional interpretation as well.
Constitutional gains by political activists are often more enduring, and
their enforcement is more widespread, than are court rulings
enforcing those rights.36 To be successful, however, political activists
need to be well-organized and coordinated. Like constitutional
litigants, they need resources to spread their message, and to advocate
successfully in the political realm.
Many freedom seekers engaged in political activism. They
published narratives and gave speeches which were popular and well
attended.37 According to historian Manisha Sinha, “[i]n the two
decades before the Civil War, a new generation of black abolitionists,
most of them fugitive slaves, came to dominate the movement.”38 The
most prominent fugitive from slavery was Frederick Douglass.
Douglass, who had escaped from slavery in Maryland as a young man,
was a charismatic orator who became a close ally of leading abolitionist
William Lloyd Garrison.39 In 1847, Douglass started an antislavery
paper, The North Star, which “became the voice of black
abolitionism.”40 In the 1850s Douglass created a sensation when he
proclaimed that the Constitution was antislavery, broke his alliance
with Garrison, and joined the antislavery constitutionalists who
eventually formed the Republican Party.41 Douglass developed a
33 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 15; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); REBECCA E.
ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006).
34 See, e.g., ZIETLOW, supra note 33, at 5. Justice Antonin Scalia acknowledged the
claims of Second Amendment activists in a footnote to his opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms. See
554 U.S. 570, 624 n.24 (2007).
35 See ZIETLOW, supra note 33, at 98–99.
36 See id. at 11.
37 FONER, supra note 6, at 24.
38 SINHA, supra note 19, at 421.
39 See id. at 425.
40 Id. at 426.
41 See id. at 425.
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comprehensive theory of antislavery constitutionalism and became an
effective leader of the antislavery cause. In his influential autobiography, Frederick Douglass described his experience as a slave, and
his escape from slavery, to illustrate the cruelty of the institution and
generate opposition to slavery.42 Douglass’s lived experience contributed to his effectiveness as an antislavery activist.
Other prominent fugitives from slavery included Henry Bibb, who
fled from slavery in Kentucky and moved to Ohio.43 After the passage
of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, Bibb moved to Canada, where he
published his own paper, the Voice of the Fugitive.44 Living in upstate
New York at the time was Jermain Wesley Loguen, who fled slavery in
Tennessee to become a minister in the African Methodist Episcopal
church and a leader in the Underground Railroad.45 By 1860, Loguen
becamse known as the “King of the Underground Railroad.”46
Douglass, Bibb, Loguen, and other fugitives from slavery also
participated in the Northern civil rights movement, advocating for the
rights of free black people.47
C. Performative Constitutionalism
The third category of constitutional actors are people who use
their actions to assert constitutional claims. I call this category
“performative constitutionalism.” Throughout history, groups of
people have engaged in performative constitutionalism, engaging in
mass protests and organized demonstrations. In the 1920s and 1930s,
millions of labor activists staged strikes to assert their right to organize
into unions and bargain collectively.48 In the 1950s and 1960s, civil
rights activists engaged in many symbolic demonstrations asserting
their right to be free of racial segregation and to be treated as equal
citizens.49 For example, Rosa Parks protested Alabama laws requiring
segregation of public transportation by refusing to give up her seat in
the front of the bus. Freedom Riders engaged in the same protest
42 See DOUGLASS, supra note 19.
43 SINHA, supra note 19, at 430–31.
44 See Fred Landon, Henry Bibb, a Colonizer, 5 J. NEGRO HIST. 437, 442–43; H. Bibb &
J.T. Holly, Prospectus of the Third Volume of the Voice of the Fugitive, VOICE OF THE FUGITIVE,
Dec. 2, 1852.
45 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 1.
46 Id.
47 For example, Frederick Douglass was the leading African American advocate for
the rights of free black people of his generation. See Bradley Rebeiro, The Work Is Not Done:
Frederick Douglass and Black Suffrage, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1513 (2022).
48 See ZIETLOW, supra note 33, at 93–95.
49 For an excellent discussion of the constitutional significance of this activism, see
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, THE SIT-INS: PROTEST AND LEGAL CHANGE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA (2018).
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while riding interstate buses into southern states. Hundreds of
protestors engaged in sit-in demonstrations in restaurants, using their
bodies to assert their right to be served equally with white people in a
place of public accommodation.50 These people engaged in organized
political action and used words to articulate their political message.
Yet there is no doubt that their willingness to use their bodies, often
putting themselves in danger and sometimes risking their lives,
strengthened their claims and contributed to their victories in the
political process.
In her lecture about the Arab Spring demonstrations in Tahrir
Square, Cairo, Judith Butler observed that in that demonstration,
“bodies congregate, they move and speak together, and they lay claim
to a certain space as public space.”51 In the lecture, Butler describes
how activists used their bodies to assert a claim to public space. Butler
argues that “in the case of public assemblies, we see quite clearly not
only that there is a struggle over what will be public space, but a
struggle as well over those basic ways in which we are, as bodies,
supported in the world—a struggle against disenfranchisement,
effacement, and abandonment.”52 Claiming the space enables the
poorest and most disenfranchised people to assert “the right to have
rights”53 by using their bodies “against those forces that seek to
monopolize legitimacy.”54 Like the activists in Tahrir Square, freedom
seekers asserted their “right to have rights” when they fled across state
borders. Their allies in the North saw aiding fugitives from slavery as
a form of “practical antislavery action,” what David Ruggles, secretary
of the New York Committee of Vigilance and Underground Railroad
leader, called “practical abolition.”55
Enslaved people were subject to legal restrictions and lacked basic
human rights. They were prohibited from engaging in economic
activity without their slaveholder’s permission, they could not travel on
or off the plantation without written permission, and they were
forbidden to read, write, or testify in court in any case involving a white
person.56 Slave patrols and state militias arrested enslaved people who
violated these rules and brutally punished those who transgressed the

50 Id. at 14.
51 See Butler, supra note 10.
52 Id.
53 Id. (citing ARENDT, supra note 10).
54 Id.
55 FONER, supra note 6, at 20.
56 See HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 70 (1943); W.E.B.
DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART
WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,
1860–1880, at 10 (1935).
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restrictions.57 Nonetheless, enslaved people engaged in a myriad of
transgressions, acts of resistance against their slaveholders, including
sabotage, shamming illness, and individual attempts at assassination of
slaveholders.58 A significant number of enslaved people engaged in
outright rebellion.59 With these actions, enslaved people destabilized
the institution of slavery and caused slaveholders to fear them and the
abolitionists who might incite them to rebel.60
Enslaved people who had the courage and fortitude engaged in
multiple facets of transgression. First, they crossed from slavery into
freedom by transgressing state borders. In the Deep South, where it
was not feasible to escape to formally free territory, freedom seekers
fled to cities such as New Orleans and Richmond, Virginia, to lose
themselves in the free black populations.61 Others fled to remote rural
areas such as the Dismal Swamp where it was relatively easy for them to
hide.62 Still others fled across national borders, into Canada and
Mexico.63 During the Civil War, freedom seekers transgressed battle
lines, seeking freedom and asking to fight for the Union.64 Thus,
freedom seekers sought not only formal freedom in places where
slavery was legally abolished, but also informal freedom, where they
attempted to live free illegally.65 In Southern states, fugitives from
slavery undermined the institution and deprived their masters of their
labor and a significant source of their wealth.66 Wherever they went,
fugitives from slavery sought to enforce the freedom principle—that

57 See APTHEKER, supra note 56, at 67; Müller, supra note 23, at 137, 145.
58 See APTHEKER, supra note 56, at 141–43.
59 Id. at 11 (arguing that The Nat Turner Rebellion was not an isolated, unique
phenomenon, “but the culmination of a series of slave conspiracies and revolts which had
occurred in the immediate past”). Aptheker estimates that as many as 250 groups of
enslaved people of ten or more plotted or engaged in rebellions. Id. at 162.
60 See id. at 50–51.
61 See FONER, supra note 6, at 16; Müller, supra note 23, at 139 (explaining that
Richmond, Virginia, “served as a beacon of freedom” to enslaved people in other parts of
the state).
62 See FONER, supra note 6, at 16; Sylviane A. Diouf, Borderland Maroons, in FUGITIVE
SLAVES, supra note 17, at 168, 190; Damian Alan Pargas, Seeking Freedom in the Midst of Slavery:
Fugitive Slaves in the Antebellum South, in FUGITIVE SLAVES, supra note 17, at 116, 124.
63 See FONER, supra note 6, at 137 (pointing out that in Canada, black people were
safer and had more rights, including serving on juries, testifying in court, and voting);
Mekala Audain, “Design His Course to Mexico”: The Fugitive Slave Experience in the Texas-Mexico
Borderlands, 1850–1853, in FUGITIVE SLAVES, supra note 17, at 232, 234–35 (explaining that
enslaved people in Texas fled to Mexico because they had learned that Mexico was close,
there were economic opportunities, and a greater degree of social acceptance).
64 See DUBOIS, supra note 56, at 65–66; OAKES, supra note 11, at 146.
65 Pargas, supra note 62, at 131.
66 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 4–5 (pointing out that by transgressing borders
freedom seekers collectively cost their “masters” as much as $200,000 a year).
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by fleeing to free soil they would become free. By transgressing
borders from slave to free they expanded the scope of free spaces.
Foremost among these freedom seekers was Harriet Tubman, who
escaped slavery in Maryland in 1849.67 During the 1850s, Tubman
made repeated trips to rescue other enslaved people, leading as many
as seventy men, women, and children out of bondage.68 Tubman also
worked with Jermain Loguen and others in the upstate New York
Underground Railroad.69 Antislavery crusader John Brown used the
nickname “General” to refer to Tubman, and she was popularly
referred to as “Moses.”70 Though generally viewed as a heroic figure
in the antislavery movement, Harriet Tubman is not generally
considered to be a constitutional actor. She spoke out against slavery,
calling slavery “the next thing to hell,” but she did not speak in
constitutional terms.71 Nonetheless, she made constitutional claims
with her actions, undermining slavery and sparking constitutional
controversy.
Freedom seekers like Harriet Tubman asserted constitutional
claims with their bodies and their actions, what historian Christopher
Bonner calls “black thought in radical practice.”72 Freedom seekers
knew little about the law, but they knew the basic essentials—that
slavery was allowed and encouraged where they lived but outlawed in
other states within the same country. If they were able to reach those
states, they believed, their legal status would change, and as a result,
they would be free and could live a better life. It is important to note
that I am not claiming that all fugitives from slavery were seeking
constitutional change. They had a variety of motivations which were
primarily personal.73 However, they all had the same fundamental
goal—freedom for themselves and their families. For those who hoped
to stay within the United States and not escape to Canada, their

67
68
69

See SINHA, supra note 19, at 438.
Id.; see FONER, supra note 6, at 190.
MILTON C. SERNETT, HARRIET TUBMAN: MYTH, MEMORY, AND HISTORY 78 (2007);
SINHA, supra note 19, at 439.
70 SINHA, supra note 19, at 439; FONER, supra note 6, at 191.
71 See SINHA, supra note 19, at 439.
72 BONNER, supra note 9, at 97. Similarly, in her recent book about the lives of free
black people in antebellum Baltimore, legal historian Martha Jones details how they
secured their rights by “ordinary acts” such as filing lawsuits and appearing in court, and
traveling within the state. See JONES, supra note 17, at 101 (“[T]he act of traveling could
give rise to a right to travel.”); id. at 111 (suing for debts was exercising the right to contract,
a right of citizenship later recognized in the 1866 Civil Rights Act).
73 The reasons for fleeing that were reported most commonly by fugitives from slavery
were physical abuse, the threat of sale of oneself or one’s family members, and their
slaveholders reneging on promises of manumission. See FONER, supra note 6, at 198–99; see
also Pargas, supra note 62, at 119.
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freedom would require constitutional change. Those who fled to
Canada after the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act challenged the
very identity of the United States as a country which championed
freedom, “offer[ing] a jarring counterpoint to the familiar image of
the United States as an asylum for those denied liberty in other
countries.”74
Unlike the civil rights and labor activists, and those activists in
Tahrir Square, freedom seekers did not congregate with other people
in the open to assert their claims. Freedom seekers travelled in small
groups and as clandestinely as possible. However, all of these actors
had one thing in common—their use of public space was part of their
constitutional claim. Because labor activists had few resources, they
needed access to the streets and public parks to congregate and
communicate. Activists in Tahrir Square transformed private spaces
into public ones, expanding the arena for political protest.75 In Hague
v. Committee for Industrial Organization, the United States Supreme
Court held that labor activists had a First Amendment right to assemble
peaceably in a public place to express their views.76 The Hague case
established a constitutional right for activists to use public spacs to
make rights claims and recognized that making those claims was an act
of citizenship.
During the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights protestors used public
spaces, including streets, parks, lunch counters, and public
transportation, to assert rights claims.77 They made those claims not
only with their voices, but also with their actions. Sit-in protestors were
motivated in part by the desire to have a place to eat while they were
out shopping.78 But they also sought to be treated with basic human
dignity, and they sparked a debate on the meaning of the Constitution
and equality.79 By asserting claims to public spaces, civil rights activists
turned those places into legally contested spaces. Freedom seekers
asserted their freedom of mobility by crossing, or transgressing, state
lines. By transgressing the borders between slave and free states, they
also transformed border states into legally contested spaces that
became central to the battle over slavery in the United States.

74
75
76

FONER, supra note 6, at 26.
See Butler, supra note 10.
307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939); see LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH:
AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE 227–28 (2016).
77 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63,
at 129, 145, 271, 766–68 (1988) (describing civil rights’ activists’ protests at lunch counters,
streets, and transportation).
78 See SCHMIDT, supra note 49, at 36.
79 Id. at 5, 14.
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D. Transgressing Battle Lines
During the Civil War, thousands of freedom seekers escaped
across Union lines and demanded their freedom.80 President
Abraham Lincoln framed the war as an attempt to save the Union, not
to end slavery. However, according to historian James Oakes, “by the
time Lincoln was inaugurated, virtually all Republicans believed that
secession meant war and war meant immediate emancipation.”81 At
first, enslaved people were not sure how to react to the conflict.82
Before long, however, enslaved people realized that the war would
provide them with a chance to flee to freedom, and to fight for that
freedom. Just before the war, a large number of freedom seekers fled
north.83 Gradually those fugitives from slavery “became organized and
formed a great labor force for the army.”84 “Union troops were a
powerful magnet” for freedom seekers.85 Many of those who fled
requested the right to fight for the Union army, and again after some
hesitation the Union agreed. The effort of those former slaves was so
valuable to the Union cause that President Abraham Lincoln issued
the Emancipation Proclamation as a war measure, affirming that the
Civil War would end slavery.
Black people were centerstage in the war from the beginning
simply because the war was fought in the South, where over 4,000,000
black people lived, mostly enslaved.86 The Confederacy counted on
slaves as laborers to raise food and money for the army.87 According
to historian W.E.B. DuBois, “[w]hen Northern armies entered the
South they became armies of emancipation.”88 By transgressing Union
battle lines, freedom seekers deprived Confederate forces of their
labor. Moreover, enslaved people “knew, more clearly and earlier than
others, that the Army of Lincoln was to be an Army of Liberation.
They, therefore, assisted it.”89
The first freedom seekers to cross battle lines did so only a month
after Confederate soldiers fired on Fort Sumter. On May 23, 1861,

80 See OAKES, supra note 11, at 196.
81 Id. at 50.
82 See DUBOIS, supra note 56, at 59; see also APTHEKER, supra note 56, at 357–58
(explaining that enslaved people saw the impending war and predicted that it would end
slavery). Slaveholders feared the same result, and initially strengthened local militias to
prevent enslaved people from fleeing or revolting. See OAKES, supra note 11, at 85–86.
83 DUBOIS, supra note 56, at 59.
84 Id.
85 OAKES, supra note 11, at 146.
86 DUBOIS, supra note 56, at 57.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 55.
89 APTHEKER, supra note 56, at 359.
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three fugitives from slavery approached the Union forces at Fort
Monroe, Virginia, and asked General Benjamin Butler for asylum.90
General Butler met with the freedom seekers and accepted their offer
of help.91 Butler used his military power to “confiscate” enslaved
people and grant them their freedom. By the end of July 1861,
approximately 900 enslaved people had escaped to Butler’s camp.92
Not all Union commanders agreed with Butler, and some cooperated
with slave catchers to return freedom seekers to slavery.93 Some rankand-file soldiers willingly assisted slaveholders, but many did not want
to turn fugitives away.94 Over time, Union forces realized that they
needed to take “the power which slaves put into the hands of the
South” in order to win the war.95
The transgressive advocacy of fugitives from slavery brought about
the end of the hated federal Fugitive Slave Acts. In March 1862,
Congress enacted a bill prohibiting the United States military from
enforcing the Fugitive Slave Clause.96 The new policy made it all but
impossible for the army to return fugitives from slavery and put
pressure on pro-slavery forces in the Northern border states.97 During
the war, Congress abolished slavery in the District of Columbia and in
the western territories.98 By August 1862, President Lincoln had to face
the truth—not just that enslaved people ought to be free, but that
thousands already were free.99 Congress put a stamp of approval on
General Butler’s “confiscation” strategy by enacting two Confiscation
Acts, which freed all slaves of loyal masters and called for a presidential
proclamation that persons still aiding and abetting the rebellion would
have their property (including enslaved people) seized by Union
forces.100 Within days of signing the bill, Lincoln drafted the first
version of the Emancipation Proclamation.101 Lincoln and his allies in
Congress saw emancipation as both a punishment for rebellious

90 OAKES, supra note 11, at 95.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 106.
93 See id. at 107, 167, 176–77.
94 Id. at 178.
95 DUBOIS, supra note 56, at 82.
96 OAKES, supra note 11, at 189; see CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1861); id.
at 358–59, 956 (1862).
97 OAKES, supra note 11, at 191.
98 See id. at 328.
99 DUBOIS, supra note 56, at 82.
100 Confiscation Act of 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319; Confiscation Act of 1862, ch. 195, 12
Stat. 589; see OAKES, supra note 11, at 236–37.
101 OAKES, supra note 11, at 237–38.
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slaveholders and a reward for the loyalty of the formerly enslaved
people who supported the Union cause.102
Many freedom seekers who crossed battle lines sought to join the
Union Army and fight for their freedom.103 At first, Lincoln resisted,
unsure of whether formerly enslaved people would make good soldiers
and fearing white backlash.104 However, freedom seekers had been
working for the Union Army since the beginning of the war, and they
were ready to serve as soldiers.105 About 180,000 formerly enslaved
people served in the Union Army, around 10% of the Union troops.106
Those soldiers included leaders of the Underground Railroad,
including Albert Fountain, Thomas Garrett and Harriet Tubman, who
served as a spy for the Union Army.107 During her service to the Union,
Tubman led a raid that liberated over 700 enslaved people on the
Combahee River, South Carolina.108 As freedom seeker William
Singleton later explained, “I wore the uniform of those men in Blue,
who through four years of suffering wiped away with their blood the
stain of slavery and purged the Republic of its sin.”109 The sacrifices of
freedom seekers ensured that the Civil War did end slavery and
establish freedom for themselves and their posterity. The Civil War
was essential to the abolition of slavery in the United States, and
freedom seekers were essential to the success of that effort.
II.

THE FREEDOM PRINCIPLE AND SPACES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT

The Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV arguably established a
national rule that slaves did not gain their liberty by escaping to free
locales.110 However, with their words and their actions, freedom
102 Id. at 244.
103 See, e.g., SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 7–8 (describing how he fled from the
Confederate forces to the Union side in North Carolina).
104 OAKES, supra note 11, at 377.
105 Id.
106 Black Civil War Soldiers, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/american-civilwar/black-civil-war-soldiers [https://perma.cc/PU8D-XG7V] (Jan. 11, 2022).
107 FONER, supra note 6, at 225.
108 Id.
109 SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 1.
110 See FONER, supra note 6, at 20. Antislavery constitutionalists disagreed, pointing out
that the Clause did not contain the word slave, but only “person[s] held to service or
labour,” and argued that enslaved people could not be held to service or labor because they
were unable to enter into contracts. Id. at 37 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3) (citing
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 446 (Max Farrand ed., 1911));
see also LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (Boston, Bela Marsh
1845), as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 1, 230, 231; JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY: TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE
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seekers resisted that interpretation of the Constitution and sought to
enforce the “‘freedom principle’—the doctrine that once a slave
(other than a fugitive) left a jurisdiction where local law established
slavery, he or she automatically became free.”111 Freedom seekers thus
created spaces of constitutional conflict over the basic structure of our
government, revealing the fragility of our constitutional structure.
Freedom seekers destabilized the relationship between slave states and
free states, creating conflict over comity and interstate relations. When
Congress reacted to that conflict by enacting stronger pro-slavery
measures, freedom seekers and their allies resisted the authority of the
federal government and engaged in a militant states’ rights movement.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, freedom seekers asserted claims
to fundamental human rights. By transgressing borders, they asserted
the right to travel. When arrested, they claimed due process rights.
Most importantly, they asserted the right to have rights—the right to
be treated as a human being with protection under the law.
A. Comity
The plight of freed slaves raised issues of interstate comity, notably
regarding the relationship between free states and those that
authorized slavery, governed by Article IV of the Constitution.
Officials in Southern states relied on the Article IV Fugitive Slave
Clause to demand cooperation from Northern state officials in
retrieving those who were accused of being fugitives.112 Northern state
officials claimed that they had the power to recognize free black
people as citizens who were entitled to rights under the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause. These disputes also raised the
question of the extent to which the Full Faith and Credit Clause
required states to recognize the legal status of people travelling from
other states. Those conflicts were most pressing in the border states as
fugitives crossed from slave states to free.113

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THAT SUBJECT (Cleveland, J. Calyer 1849), as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 1, at 237, 245–46.
111 FONER, supra note 6, at 20.
112 See Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 615,
620–27 (1993).
113 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 139, 182, 224 (suggesting that the border of Missouri
and Illinois was “one of the zones of maximum conflict that existed along the borders
between slave states and Free States”). See generally VANDERVELDE, supra note 18
(describing twelve cases in which slaves attempted to win their freedom in St. Louis on the
antebellum frontier).
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1. The “Fugitive Slave” Clause
When freedom seekers entered states where slavery was not legal,
they immediately raised the question of whether their status changed
once they stepped on to free soil.114 Proslavery advocates argued that
slavery was the law of the land, and that the Fugitive Slave Clause
required people in free states to aid in returning people who were
accused of being fugitive slaves.115 “Structurally at least, fugitive slave
rendition, like privileges and immunities . . . seemed to be a matter of
comity.”116 Some freedom seekers filed suits asserting their change of
legal status, and prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, some of these litigants prevailed.117 However, most of the
disputes over what to do with people accused of being fugitives played
out on the ground.
In Northern cities with large communities of free black people,
fugitives from slavery found important allies who helped fugitives to
escape and assert legal rights.118 Many free black people felt a
commonality of interest with fugitives from slavery, knowing that they
could also be captured and accused of being a slave. They formed
vigilance societies, provided shelter to fugitives, and offered legal
assistance for those fugitives who were captured by slave catchers.119
Members of vigilance societies also took to the street en masse and
aided in rescuing fugitives who were detained by law enforcement
officers and slave catchers.120 Over time they developed a network of
support and hiding places for fugitives which became known as the
Underground Railroad. In St. Louis, the free black organization
Knights of Liberty helped the Underground Railroad.121 In southern
Indiana, free black people were key to its success.122 Free black
communities in the North attracted fugitive slaves, and residents of
those communities protected the fugitives.123 The activism of free
black people and their white allies who supported freedom seekers

114 See FINKELMAN, supra note 12, at 4.
115 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”), amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII.
116 Finkelman, supra note 112, at 620.
117 See generally VANDERVELDE, supra note 18.
118 See FONER, supra note 6, at 15.
119 See id. at 20, 65; BONNER, supra note 9, at 96, 98.
120 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 96.
121 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 142–43.
122 See id. at 188.
123 See id. at 222 (explaining that the free black settlements in Ohio attracted fugitives).
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enforced the freedom principle in Northern states, and made holding
slaves in border states like Missouri and Kentucky risky and
“unpredictable.”124
Renditions of fugitive slaves generally provoked “a firestorm of
protest in the cities and towns where they occurred,” including Boston,
Detroit, Philadelphia, Chicago and Cleveland.125 Abolitionists in
Boston insisted that their city would be safe for fugitives.126 In Chicago,
mobs attacked slavecatchers, making the city a safe haven for fugitive
slaves.127 Antislavery activists organized demonstrations to resist slave
catchers and law enforcement officials who were aiding them. Crowds
pushed their way into courtrooms and rescued accused fugitives.128
Black crowds often “overwhelmed the authorities’ capacity to control
them.”129 According to historian R.J.M. Blackett, “[t]hese black crowds
were the foot soldiers without whom resistance would have been muted
if not impossible.”130
Freedom seekers thus forced debate over the divisive issue of
comity between free and slave states. Antislavery activists in the North
argued that the natural state of man was freedom and that slavery
could only be established by positive law.131 Thus, they insisted that
officials in free states had no obligation to assist Southern slavecatchers
who travelled into their state even though they were required to do so
under the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.132 Slaveholders and their allies in
Southern states demanded help from Northern officials to secure and
return the fugitives from slavery. They insisted that an enslaved
person’s legal status remained the same wherever the enslaved person
travelled.133 They rejected the freedom principle and argued that the
Article IV Fugitive Slave Clause required national recognition of
slavery. Thus, freedom seekers exacerbated the irreconcilable differences that divided the nation.

124 Id. at 142, 188 (noting the support offered to slaves escaping from Kentucky by free
black communities in southern Indiana).
125 See id. at 21, 40, 65–66 (highlighting examples of protests by free black communities
in Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Boston, and Detroit).
126 Id. at 66.
127 See id. at 168.
128 Id. at 67.
129 Id. at 73.
130 Id.
131 See ZIETLOW, supra note 14, at 39.
132 See Finkelman, supra note 112, at 618.
133 See FINKELMAN, supra note 11, at 10.
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2. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
Freedom seekers also sparked disputes over the meaning of the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.134 Slaveholders feared
that their slaves might try to escape, and they viewed free black people
as a threat. Some Southern states enacted laws asserting the power to
capture black people who were travelling into the state and impress
them into slavery.135 Those laws angered representatives of free states,
who asserted their states’ power to recognize free black people as
citizens with fundamental rights, including the right to travel. They
argued that their states’ citizens were entitled to those rights under the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Not all Northern states recognized the right of free black people
to travel. Prompted by fears that Southern states would retaliate to
Northern non-compliance by expelling free black people, some
Northern border states enacted laws prohibiting free black people
from entering the state.136 Moreover, Southern states refused to honor
the privileges and immunities of Northern free black people who
entered their states.137 Free black people were thus always in danger
of being accused as fugitive slaves, captured, and sold into captivity.138
In the decade leading up to the Civil War, this danger extended into
the Northern border states.
Freedom seekers and their allies exercised the right to travel and
created free spaces in Northern cities and border states. The border
city of Cincinnati, Ohio, became a magnet for escaping enslaved
people.139 After the State v. Farr holding that an enslaved woman
became free when her master voluntarily took her into the state,
abolitionists “inform[ed] slaves of the prospect of freedom as soon as
they arrived in the state.”140 This made slaveowners apprehensive
about bringing their slaves into Ohio. Settlements of free black people
in Ohio also attracted fugitives, and Ashtabula County in northern

134 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
135 These laws, known as “Seamen’s Act[s],” were primarily addressed to free black
sailors whose ships docked in Southern ports. See id. at 280 & n.118; see also Philip M.
Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seaman Acts, 1822–1848, 1 J.S. HIST. 3
(1935).
136 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 76 (noting that Indiana enacted legislation to
exclude free black people from Southern states).
137 Finkelman, supra note 112, at 616–17.
138 See Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts:
Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921, 933 (2012) (explaining that South
Carolina and Georgia statutes required free blacks to prove that they were free).
139 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 222.
140 TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 143–44; see also BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 224 (explaining
that “leave-taking fever” followed the success of fleeing enslaved people in Ohio).
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Ohio became known as a “no man’s land” for slave catchers.141 The
city of Chicago was also known as a safe place for fugitives from slavery.
Slaveholders generally stayed away from the Northern city because
mobs there often attacked slaveholders and arrested them for
kidnapping.142 Freedom seekers knew that state law enforcement
officials would not pursue them or assist in the capture of enslaved
people.143 In upstate New York, leaders of the Underground Railroad
openly bragged about assisting escaping slaves.144 Thus, to a large
extent, freedom seekers enforced the freedom principle prior to 1850.
Thus, freedom seekers challenged the legal norms that held together
a country which was divided by slavery.
B. Federalism
Fugitives from slavery were the immediate catalyst for the 1850
Fugitive Slave Act, which provoked a states’ rights movement in
Northern states.145 Many Northern officials simply refused to cooperate with Southern slavecatchers, defying the 1793 Act.146 Over time,
slaveholding interests became convinced that the 1793 Fugitive Slave
Act’s provisions requiring local officials to assist with the capture of
fleeing slaves was ineffective.147 The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act created
the first federal police force, “a massive slavecatching infrastructure for
all of the United States.”148 Like the 1793 Act, the 1850 law contained
no procedural protections for those who were accused of being
fugitives from slavery.149 Well before the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott
decision, Congress had rejected the freedom principle and
nationalized slavery.150 According to historian R.J.M. Blackett, the
passage of the new law “was a firebrand thrown into every black
community.”151 This 1850 Act “threatened fugitive slaves, free blacks,
and abolitionists alike.”152 The Act inflamed conflicts between the
states as well as conflicts between free states and the federal
government and precipitated the country’s descent into the Civil War.

141 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 236.
142 Id. at 168.
143 Id. at 161–62.
144 See FONER, supra note 6, at 123–24.
145 See id. at 25.
146 See Finkelman, supra note 112, at 620–23.
147 See id. at 622; BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 5–6.
148 BONNER, supra note 9, at 116–17.
149 See TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 155.
150 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 117 (explaining that the 1850 Act obligated all people
in the United States to support slavery).
151 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 44.
152 TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 155.
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With the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, the federal government adopted
an aggressive pro-slavery presence in Northern states. The Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 “created the first federal law enforcement
bureaucracy in the nation’s history.”153 The law provided for the
appointment of a federal commissioner in every county of the nation,
authorized federal marshals to aid in the capture of fugitive slaves, thus
“plac[ing] the prestige of the national government behind the
rendition of fugitive slaves.”154 Commissioners were expected to conduct hearings with few procedural protections for the accused, and
were paid $10 if they ruled in favor of the slave-catcher but only $5 if
they ruled against, creating an obvious incentive to rule in favor of
slave-catchers.155
It would be difficult to exaggerate the devastating impact that the
1850 Fugitive Slave Act had on free black communities in the United
States, as well as the freedom seekers among them. Especially in
border cities like Cincinnati the Act “made it easier to kidnap free
blacks with impunity.”156 Because of the Act’s weak evidentiary
standard and the far-reaching nature of federal enforcement, free
black people now lived in constant danger of being kidnapped and
sold into slavery.157 Many freedom seekers who had settled into
Northern states now fled to Canada, which they saw as the only safe
place to be.158 Black people who were not fugitives from slavery also
fled to Canada to escape the danger of being kidnapped.159 Former
slave and Underground Railroad leader Henry Bibb moved to Canada
and established a paper, Voice of the Fugitive, in which he wrote
editorials urging others to follow his example.160
Antislavery activists were not deterred from their mission and
became increasingly militant as they resisted the 1850 Act. Indeed,
passage of the 1850 Act “reinvigorated and radicalized the
153 See Paul Finkelman, A Political Show Trial in the Northern District: The OberlinWellington Fugitive Slave Rescue Case, in JUSTICE AND LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE
ERIE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO 37, 39 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue Alexander eds., 2012).
154 See Finkelman, supra note 112, at 664.
155 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 53.
156 TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 155.
157 See FONER, supra note 6, at 134.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 136–37.
160 FONER, supra note 6, at 136. Said Bibb, “This paper was started immediately after
the passage of the atrocious fugitive slave bill by the Congress,” causing British North
America to be the only truly safe haven for fugitives. According to Bibb, the Voice of the
Fugitive would serve as “the indignant Voice of the thousands of [slavery’s] escaped victims
who are now developing themselves under the genial influence of civil and religious
liberty,” to combat the pro-slavery influence of the United States on Canada and engage
“in the great battle of liberty and equality.” Bibb & Holly, supra note 44.
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[U]nderground [R]ailroad.”161 Throughout the North, people
organized rallies to condemn the law.162 Liberty Party founder and
1848 presidential nominee Gerrit Smith held such a rally in upstate
New York which was attended by 2,000 people, about fifty of whom
were openly identified as fugitives from slavery.163 The meeting
endorsed a “Letter to the American Slave” which labeled freedom
seekers as prisoners of war and promised to “plunder, burn, kill” to
help them escape.164 Frederick Douglass was reported to have told a
meeting of the American Anti-slavery Society in Syracuse, New York,
that the best way to resist the Fugitive Slave Act would be to kill two or
three slaveholders.165
Efforts to assist fugitives thus took a violent turn, and no longer
only in the borderlands.166 In October 1850, armed black people
gathered at a Detroit jail where a fugitive was held.167 In September
1851, an armed, predominantly black crowd in Christiana,
Pennsylvania, fought a group of slave catchers, including a federal
marshal and a Maryland owner.168 The federal government tried to
prosecute members of the crowd, but the jury would not convict.169 In
Boston, antislavery activists resisted the arrests of alleged fugitives with
armed mobs and attacked the federal courthouse on May 24, 1854, to
try to save Anthony Burns, an alleged fugitive from slavery.170 Free
black advocates and their allies knew that “physical confrontations with
authorities could do important work toward securing legal change.”171
Northern resistance to the Act prompted federal officials to step
up and militarize enforcement.172 In turn, the aggressive federal
enforcement of the Act prompted antislavery activists to invoke states’
rights.173 The 1850 Act led to resistance in Northern states where
people hadn’t thought much about slavery before and inspired a
Northern states’ rights movement.

161 FONER, supra note 6, at 145.
162 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 14.
163 FONER, supra note 6, at 123–24; Gerrit Smith, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps
.gov/wori/learn/historyculture/gerrit-smith.htm [https://perma.cc/C4CK-TCGM] (Feb.
26, 2015).
164 Id. at 124.
165 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 79.
166 FONER, supra note 6, at 146.
167 Id. at 145.
168 Id. at 145–46; TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 156.
169 FONER, supra note 6, at 146.
170 TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 156.
171 BONNER, supra note 9, at 96.
172 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 68.
173 See Jeffrey Schmitt, Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93
VA. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2007).
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Free Northern black people and their white allies rallied to the
cause of their enslaved brethren and engaged in civil disobedience to
disrupt federal officials enforcing the 1850 Act.174 Their resistance was
effective. “By the end of the first year of the [1850 Act’s] operation it
was clear to all dispassionate observers that, rather than quieting
agitation over slavery as so many of its proponents had hoped, it had
stirred passionate opposition and defiance.”175 So many people in
Northern communities condemned the federal commissioners that
many of them refused to take the position or resigned.176 Freedom
seekers sparked the 1861 victory for states’ rights in Kentucky v.
Dennison, when the Court ruled that the federal government could not
require the governor of Ohio to enforce the 1793 Fugitive Slave law by
returning people who were accused of being slaves that escaped from
Kentucky.177 The state’s rights movement gained momentum in
Northern states such as Ohio and Wisconsin.
For example, in 1858 in Oberlin, Ohio, civic leaders participated
in the rescue of John Price, a local black resident from the custody of
a slavecatcher who accused him of being a fugitive slave.178 The federal
prosecutor indicted thirty-seven men for violating the 1850 Act.179 The
case turned into a political show trial and a forum for the rescuers to
voice their antislavery beliefs.180 In the midst of the slavecatcher’s
testimony, the Lorain County deputy sheriff walked into the
courtroom and arrested him for kidnapping.181 Thousands of people
protested outside the Cleveland jail where the protestors were held.182
In the end, federal and state officials entered into a compromise. The
federal officials dropped charges against the remaining rescuers, and
the state officials dropped kidnapping charges against the
slavecatchers.183 The Oberlin resisters’ trial publicized the plight of
fugitive slaves and sparked more resistance to federal authorities.184
A dispute over the plight of a freedom seeker in Wisconsin led to
a United States Supreme Court decision, Ableman v. Booth.185 In March
174 See BLACKETT supra note 8, at 143.
175 Id. at 86.
176 Id. at 59.
177 See 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1860) (“And we think it clear, that the Federal
Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such,
any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it . . . .”).
178 See Finkelman, supra note 153, at 38–39.
179 Id. at 38.
180 Id. at 47, 58.
181 Id. at 60.
182 Id. at 68.
183 Id. at 68.
184 See id. at 68–70.
185 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
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of 1854, a man named Joshua Glover was captured, accused of being a
fugitive, and held in Milwaukee jail.186 News of his arrest quickly
spread, and a large crowd stormed the jail.187 Local abolitionist
Sherman Booth addressed the crowd: “Citizens of Milwaukee! Shall
we have Star Chamber proceedings here? [A]nd shall a Man be
dragged back to Slavery from our Free Soil, without an open trial of his
right to Liberty?”188 The federal marshal arrested Booth for assisting
fugitive slaves.189 The district court’s commissioner found probable
cause that Booth had violated the 1850 Act.190 While jailed, Booth
turned the tables on our system of federalism and filed a habeas
petition in state court.191 “For the people of Wisconsin . . . the federal
prosecution made the danger and injustice of the Fugitive Slave Act
take on a new meaning.”192 Public opinion swayed in Booth’s favor
and sparked support for state sovereignty.193
The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with Booth and ordered
him released from federal custody.194 In doing so, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court expressed an extreme states’ rights position and
example of antislavery constitutionalism. Of course, the United States
Supreme Court overturned the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Taney’s opinion in the case reaffirmed the supremacy of federal
law and the authority of the United States Supreme Court to interpret
that law.195 However, Chief Justice Taney’s opinion was not persuasive
to the citizens of the state of Wisconsin, who continued to advocate for
states’ rights. Like the Dred Scott decision of the same year, Ableman v.
Booth exacerbated tensions between opponents and proponents of

186 Schmitt, supra note 173, at 1323.
187 Id. at 1324–25.
188 Id. at 1324.
189 Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 507.
190 Schmitt, supra note 173, at 1328.
191 Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 507–08.
192 Schmitt, supra note 173, at 1339.
193 Id. at 1340.
194 Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 511; see Schmitt, supra note 173, at 1316.
195 Ableman, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 515 (“[N]o one will suppose that a Government
which has now lasted nearly seventy years, enforcing its laws by its own tribunals, and
preserving the union of the States, could have lasted a single year . . . if offences against its
laws could not have been punished without the consent of the State in which the culprit
was found.”). The Court affirmed judicial supremacy: “And it is manifest that this ultimate
appellate power in a tribunal created by the Constitution itself was deemed essential to
secure the independence and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of
action assigned to it . . . .” Id. at 518; see also id. at 524 (“No State judge or court, after they
are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States,
has any right to interfere with him.”).
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slavery and contributed to the election of Abraham Lincoln as
president two years later and the Civil War that followed.196
III.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS

By transgressing borders, freedom seekers asserted their own
claims to national citizenship and fundamental human rights. The
commonality of interests between freedom seekers and free black
activists helped to shape the rights claims made by those activists and
strengthened the effectiveness of those claims.197 Black Northerners
lived in a “precarious freedom.”198 According to historian Viola
Müller, “[t]he threat of slavery was ever-present to the enslaved, the
free and the illegal alike.”199 As Müller points out, “the very meaning
of freedom was framed within experiences of captivity or the threat
thereof.”200 Like enslaved people, free black people lacked basic
citizenship rights and were vulnerable to exploitation.201 Northern
states’ black laws prohibited them from testifying in cases involving
whites, voting, serving on juries, and exercising other essential civil
rights.202 The very real danger of being kidnapped and losing
everything colored their everyday experience but also spurred them
on to activism.203 Antislavery activists, including free black activists,
made rights claims that resonated with freedom seekers’ transgressive
constitutionalism.
After the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress enforced the
rights of formerly enslaved people with the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished
slavery and involuntary servitude throughout the country,204 enforcing
the freedom seekers’ right to be free people with fundamental human
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause conveyed
birthright citizenship to formerly enslaved people and protected their

196 Schmitt, supra note 173, at 1348.
197 See TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 147 (arguing that free black people in Cincinnati felt
an “implicit racial obligation” to help freedom seekers); Müller, supra note 23, at 147 (“[I]n
practice virtually the entire African American community [in Richmond, Virginia,]
functioned as a receiving society for runaway slaves in need.”).
198 BONNER, supra note 9, at 95.
199 Müller, supra note 23, at 148.
200 Id.
201 See id. at 139 (pointing out that like fugitives from slavery, free blacks in Richmond
Virginia were “vulnerable and undocumented residents”).
202 See MASUR, supra note 17, at xi; TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 30.
203 See FONER, supra note 6 at 19–20 (describing vigilance committees in New York
City); JONES, supra note 17, at 98 (descrbing free black activists’ advocacy for the right to
travel).
204 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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rights of citizenship,205 including the right to travel, which had been
asserted by freedom seekers with their bodies. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause ensures that all “persons” who are
deprived of their liberty are entitled to due process of law,206 which had
been denied to freedom seekers accused of being fugitive slaves. This
Part briefly discusses the provisions of the Reconstruction
Amendments and statutes which enforced the rights and claims that
had been raised by freedom seekers and their free black allies.
A. The “Right to Have Rights”
Enslaved people had “no rights that anybody was bound to
respect.”207 With their transgressive constitutionalism, however,
freedom seekers asserted their “right to have rights”—to be free and
to be treated as human beings with fundamental human rights.208 Over
time, fugitives from slavery and free black people began to see
themselves as one race, united against their oppressors—they
increasingly believed in “their collective right to be free.”209 Advocates
often invoked natural rights in their arguments against slavery and for
the rights of free black people. For example, in 1835 the Ohio AntiSlavery Society issued a statement citing the Declaration of
Independence and making universalistic rights claims, arguing that
black laws abridged the fundamental rights of African Americans in
the state.210 In the words of formerly enslaved William Singleton,
freedom seekers sought “not to be treated as things without souls any
more, but as human beings.”211
In published narratives, fugitives from slavery invoked the
Declaration of Independence as a source of their right to life, liberty,
and property. For example, freedom seeker William Craft claimed that
having heard the words of the Declaration of Independence that
all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights . . . we could not understand by what
right we were held as “chattels.” Therefore, we felt perfectly
justified in undertaking the dangerous and exciting task of

205 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
206 Id.
207 SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 1.
208 See OAKES, supra note 11, at 194 (noting that after 1840 some abolitionists started
referring to fleeing as self-emancipation, recovering their natural right to freedom);
SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 6 (“And we were anxious to be free too.”).
209 See Müller, supra note 23, at 148–49.
210 See MASUR, supra note 17, at 93–94.
211 SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 9 (describing the effect of the Emancipation
Proclamation); see also id. at 10 (“As a slave I was only property, something belonging to
somebody else. . . . Now I am treated as a man. I am a part of society.”).
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“running a thousand miles” in order to obtain those rights which
are so vividly set forth in the Declaration.212

Similarly, antislavery activists invoked the Declaration of
Independence as they argued that slavery violated natural law.213 For
example, journalist and Liberty Party founder James Birney invoked
the Declaration to support his argument that slavery violated the “right
to liberty that can never be alienated.”214 Abolitionist and member of
the United States House of Representatives Gerrir Smith agreed that
“men are born with an equal right to use what is respectively theirs.”215
In the Reconstruction Congress, supporters of the Thirteenth
Amendment agreed that slavery violated the natural rights of man, and
that by abolishing slavery they would restore those rights.216
Immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment became law, the
Reconstruction Congress acted to codify those natural rights, affirming
the humanity of formerly enslaved people.217
1. Citizenship Rights
By travelling across state borders, freedom seekers implicitly
claimed one of the basic rights of citizenship—the right to travel and
the right to security of the person. The rights of citizenship were
central to what historian Kate Masur calls America’s first “civil rights
movement”—advocacy for the rights of free black people in Northern
states.218 Citizenship was considered a gateway to rights, and a
recognition of belonging on the part of the state.219 There was
widespread agreement about the importance of whether free black
people were citizens, and in the antebellum era the issue was highly
contested.220 In 1820, the congressional debate over the Missouri
Compromise centered around issues of citizenship.221 In the 1840s,
free black advocates and their allies argued that the South Carolina
212

See WILLIAM CRAFT & ELLEN CRAFT, RUNNING A THOUSAND MILES FOR FREEDOM;

OR, THE ESCAPE OF WILLIAM AND ELLEN CRAFT FROM SLAVERY iii (London, William Tweedie

1860).
213 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS.
L. REV. 393, 425 (2012).
214 JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
304 (1951) (quoting James G. Birney, Can Congress, Under the Constitution, Abolish Slavery in
the States?, ALBANY PATRIOT, May 12, 19, 20 & 22, 1847).
215 CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 521 (1854) (statement of Rep. Smith).
216 See Zietlow, supra note 213, at 429.
217 See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 234 (2001).
218 See MASUR, supra note 17, at xiii.
219 See JONES, supra note 17, at 11.
220 See id.
221 See id. at 27; ZIETLOW, supra note 33, at 26.

2022]

FREEDOM SEEKERS

1405

Seamen’s acts, which authorized the kidnapping of free black sailors
who entered South Carolina ports, violated those sailors’ citizenship
rights under the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.222 As
discussed above, disputes over citizenship rights raised issues of comity
that heightened tension between free and slaves states.223 Free black
advocates and their allies also argued that citizenship was a source of
individual rights.224 Their rights claims were similar to the claims made
by fugitives from slavery.
Many free black people saw the popularity of the colonization
movement in the 1840s and 1850s as a threat.225 Just as they feared
being kidnapped into slavery, free black people also feared that they
would be forced to colonize against their will226: “Free African
Americans framed personal security as a key aspect of citizenship.”227
They insisted that they belonged in the United States, and as citizens,
were entitled to the protection of the government. In 1852, prominent
African American abolitionist Martin Delany wrote a treatise in which
he claimed that free black people were citizens of the United States by
virtue of their birth on U.S. soil.228 Free black advocates relied on the
concept of citizenship to fight colonization and disenfranchisement.229
Black people also used the history of black military service,
especially their service in the Revolutionary War, to claim their rights
as citizens.230 This history proved not only that free black people had
lived in the country at its inception, but also that they were loyal
citizens entitled to the rights of citizenship.231 Eventually over 200,000
black soldiers, both born free and formerly enslaved, fought for the
Union Army, proving their loyalty to the Union and exercising their

222 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 41; ZIETLOW, supra note 33, at 27–28.
223 See supra Section II.A.
224 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 2–3; JONES, supra note 17, at 11; MASUR, supra note 17,
at xiii.
225 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 96–97; FONER, supra note 6, at 53 (explaining that
“[m]ost black Americans . . . rejected” colonization and viewed it “with alarm”).
226 See JONES, supra note 17, at 46–47. Roger Taney’s brother, Octavius, argued that
free black people in Maryland sowed seeds of slave unrest. Id. He proposed “radical
colonization”—forced colonization of free black people who would be held “to service for
a term of years” as a stopgap. Id. at 47.
227 BONNER, supra note 9, at 95.
228 See JONES, supra note 17, at 89 (citing MARTIN ROBISON DELANY, THE CONDITION,
ELEVATION, EMIGRATION, AND DESTINY OF THE COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
(Philadelphia, Martin Robison Delany 1852)).
229 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 11.
230 See id. at 151; SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 1 (explaining that Singleton was born a
slave “not so many years, you see, after the adoption of the Declaration of Independence
and the winning of the Revolutionary War”).
231 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 151.
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rights as citizens.232 As historian Christopher Bonner explains,
“Joining the war effort would allow black people to make their
strongest claims yet to rights as citizens.”233
Antislavery advocates also invoked citizenship to support their
opposition to slavery and support for the rights of free black activists.234
According to antislavery constitutionalists, in return for the allegiance
of its citizens, the government had a duty to protect them. 235 Thus,
security of the person is the most fundamental right of citizenship.
Freedom seekers sought protection from the free states into which they
escaped. Free black people in those states also sought protection.
They saw slavecatchers entering their states as a “visceral threat.”236
However, states were providing inadequate protection for them, so
many resorted to self-protection.237 They formed vigilance societies
not only to protect fugitives from slavery who travelled through their
communities, but also to protect themselves.238 Members of vigilance
societies helped to liberate hundreds of freedom seekers by providing
them shelter, aid, and legal assistance.239
Eventually these societies evolved into the Underground Railroad,
a loosely connected network of white and black activists who aided
freedom seekers that extended throughout the Northern states.240
They called freedom seekers “self-emancipated slaves” and some
leaders of the movement openly bragged about providing protection
for the fugitives.241 As historian Nikki Taylor explains, “[h]arboring
and forwarding fugitives was an empowering form of antislavery

232 See id. at 160.
233 Id. at 154.
234 See Zietlow, supra note 16, at 430–31.
235 See id. at 432.
236 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 103.
237 See, e.g., Editorial, Look Out For Kidnappers, VOICE OF THE FUGITIVE, Apr. 23, 1851,
https://libraries.udmercy.edu/archives/special-collections/index.php?collectionCode
=baa&record_id=946 [https://perma.cc/APV2-EL6K] (arguing that black people in
Michigan, especially Detroit, need to be on the lookout for slavecatchers who might kidnap
them). “[R]emember that you have no law to protect you, but the law of self-defense.” Id.
238 See FONER, supra note 6, at 64–65 (noting that most active participants in vigilance
committees were black, as kidnapping threatened all black families).
239 See BONNER, supra note 9, at 118.
240 See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 145; FONER, supra note 6, at 15 (arguing that the
“underground railroad represents a moment in our history when black and white
Americans worked together in a just cause”); TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 138 (“The
Cincinnati Underground Railroad was characterized by communitywide networks and
patterns of cooperative assistance to runaways.”); id. at 151 (explaining that white
abolitionists, including Salmon Chase, James Birney, and Gamaliel Bailey, also harbored
and forwarded fugitives).
241 See FONER, supra note 6, at 83 (noting that the New York Vigilance Committee
regularly held meetings to report on aid to what it called “self-emancipated slaves”).
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activism” and “a direct and immediate blow to the institution”—and it
created networks of advocacy for their own rights as free citizens of
color.242
Like freedom seekers, free African Americans faced severe
restrictions on their right to travel, restrictions which intensified as
tension grew over the plight of fugitives from slavery. In the early
1850s, the border state of Indiana enacted a new constitution which
excluded free black people and prohibited them from entering into
contracts.243 Slaveholders in Missouri enacted laws restricting the
movements of free black people.244 In the State of Maryland, laws
which restricted mobility and prohibited free black people from
entering the state dated back to 1780.245 In the 1840s and 1850s the
state tightened restrictions on free black people’s ability to travel.246
Free black people were required to obtain permits to travel which
required the endorsement of “respectable white persons.”247 Activists
argued that these restrictions violated their rights as free citizens.
Some sought passports to travel abroad and prove their citizenship.248
Like the freedom seekers, they sought to secure their rights by
“ordinary acts.”249 As legal historian Martha Jones explains, “the act of
traveling could give rise to a right to travel.”250
Free black activists also sought other rights of citizenship,
including the right to appear in court and enter into contracts.251
Courthouses became important places for shaping and establishing
rights.252 Jones explains, in courthouses “Black petitioners looked
more like rights-bearing people than the degraded subjects they were
intended to be.”253 They argued that they were citizens, and thus
entitled to basic civil rights.
In early 1866 black activists in the Pennsylvania State Equal Rights
League sent a message to Congress demanding “legal change that
would give texture to black freedom” after the Thirteenth
Amendment.254 They wanted laws to ensure their right to travel and

242
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244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
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TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 139.
See BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 102–04.
Id. at 151.
JONES, supra note 17, at 25.
See id. at 98–99.
See id.
See BONNER, supra note 9, at 81.
See JONES, supra note 17, at 101.
Id.
See id. at 111.
See id. at 70.
Id.
BONNER, supra note 9, at 168.
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their right to vote.255 They argued that people who had just been freed
from slavery were citizens with civil, political, and social rights.256 Other
black activists did the same and made the same claims.257 Prior to the
Civil War, “the national government largely ignored” the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.258
However, after the Civil War the
Reconstruction Congress established freed slaves as birthright citizens,
recognized their fundamental human rights as citizens with the 1866
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, and included the
“privileges or immunities of citizens” in the rights protected by that
Amendment.259 When Congress enacted measures creating birthright
citizenship and citizenship rights, they made the same constitutional
arguments that black activists had made260 and that freedom seekers
had asserted with their actions.
2. Due Process Rights
When freedom seekers and free black people were kidnapped and
accused of being fugitives from slavery, they argued that they were
entitled to due process of law when defending themselves from that
accusation.261 Many battles over the status of fugitives from slavery
centered around their lack of due process rights when they were
accused of being fugitives. Even before 1850, Northern states had
enacted their own laws establishing procedural rights for those accused
of being fugitives from slavery.262 Some of those state laws directly
conflicted with the federal act. For example, the Pennsylvania
Personal Liberty Act provided that babies born in the state to fugitive
slaves are free and that any person attempting to remove a “negro or
mulatto” from the state was guilty of kidnapping.263 A Vermont law
claimed fugitive slaves as “citizen[s]” with a right to habeas corpus.264
In the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the United States Supreme Court

255 See id.
256 See id.
257 See id. at 170.
258 Finkelman, supra note 112, at 616.
259 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1983 (2018)).
260 BONNER, supra note 9, at 171–72.
261 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 173, at 1325–27.
262 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 36; see, e.g., Act of Mar. 25, 1826, ch. 50, 1826 Pa. Laws
150.
263 See 1847 Penn. Laws 206–08, as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 1, supra note 1, at 234;
McKanders, supra note 138, at 928.
264 BLACKETT, supra note 8, at 36–37 (noting that the Vermont law was widely
condemned as extreme).
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affirmed Congress’s power to enact the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, and
struck down the Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law.265
However, activists continued to protest the rendition of slaves
without adequate procedural rights and to insist that those accused of
being fugitives were entitled to those rights. Antislavery activists also
argued that slavery itself denied enslaved people of their liberty
without due process of law. “James Birney asked rhetorically, ‘By what
“due process of law” is it, that two millions of “persons” are deprived
every year of the millions of dollars produced by their labor? By what
[“]due process of law[”] is it that 56,000 “persons,” the annual
increase [of] the slave population, are annually deprived of their
liberty?’”266 With the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction
Congress established a constitutional right to due process of law for all
persons who, like enslaved people, were deprived of their liberty.
3. The Right to Free Labor
Freedom seekers also claimed their right to free labor. Said
Jourden H. Banks, “[t]he slaves, moreover, not only desire, but they
look confidently for the day of their emancipation. Nor do they expect
when free to spend their time in idleness. They all know they will have
to work, but like other men they wish to have the benefit of the labour
of their hands.”267 Similarly, freedom seeker Peter Randolph
explained that “[a]ll that [escaped slaves] need is—first, freedom—
next, encouragement and a fair reward for their labor, and a suitable
opportunity to improve themselves—without which, no people, black
or white, can reasonably be expected to be industrious laborers or
enlightened citizens.”268
Antislavery activists often argued that slavery violated the
fundamental the right to free labor.269 The Thirteenth Amendment
established a right to free labor for all workers by abolishing slavery
and involuntary servitude.270 The Reconstruction Congress enforced
that right with, among other measures, the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which
prohibited race discrimination in all contracts, including employment
265 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
266 ZIETLOW, supra note 14, at 33 (quoting James G. Birney & Gamaliel Bailey, Jr.,
Editorial, Abolitionism Reviewed, PHILANTHROPIST (Cin.), Jan. 13, 1837, at 2 (alterations to
match original)).
267 JOURDEN H. BANKS, A NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OF THE LIFE OF J.H. BANKS, AN ESCAPED
SLAVE, FROM THE COTTON STATE, ALABAMA, IN AMERICA 90–91 (Liverpool, M. Rourke
1861).
268 See PETER RANDOLPH, SKETCHES OF SLAVE LIFE: OR, ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE
“PECULIAR INSTITUTION” 3–4 (Boston, Peter Randolph 1855).
269 See Zietlow, supra note 16, at 871.
270 Id. at 877.
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contracts,271 and the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act, which outlaws all forms of
involuntary servitude.272
The transgressive constitutionalism of
freedom seekers was essential to achieving this goal.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing the agency of freedom seekers, their contribution to
the downfall of slavery and to fundamental constitutional change in
our country, is important not only for symbolic reasons. It strengthens
the claims of their descendants asserting the rights that were achieved
as the result of their struggles. Enslaved people did not wait passively
for the Great Emancipator to bestow freedom on them and give them
rights. Freedom seekers played an active role in bringing down the
institution of slavery and establishing the rights that their descendants,
and other people of color, seek to assert today. Thus, recognizing the
agency of freedom seekers bolsters the case for reparations for the
harm that generations of slavery and racial discrimination wrought
against them and their descendants. Perhaps most importantly, it
undermines white supremacists’ claims of racial superiority and
commands respect for those who played an active role in fighting that
supremacy even though they had almost no resources to do so. Finally,
it is an essential step towards understanding how constitutional change
occurs, not through top-down mandates, but through grassroots
struggle and boots on the ground.

271 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981–1983 (2018)).
272 Anti-Peonage Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1581 and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2018)).

